Tripoli and Algeria, which were under Ottoman rule as semiindependent areas. According to Erhan, this interest was mainly result of the US economic needs and policies; as a rising power US needed to expand its economic base with connections abroad.
Thus, when, in the first half of the 19 th century, the semiindependent Maghrib countries prevented US trade with the region, creating a deep impact for the American trade bourgeoisie, the US started to build its first deep sea armada to mount a successful military campaign against these countries. Erhan argues convincingly that this period of war, known as Barbary Wars, had an important place and impact on US history.
After the Barbary Wars, when the US navy secured Mediterranean for its trade routes, it tried to sign a trade agreement with the Ottoman Empire. Although, the Ottomans were not desirous to enter into an agreement with the US at the beginning, especially its military needs forced the Ottoman Empire to sign the 1830 Trade Agreement with the US. The agreement included a secret clause, a first for the US diplomacy, according to which the US accepted to sale war ships to the Ottoman Empire.
According to the author, Ottoman-American bilateral relations entered the closest period of co-operation (1830-1867) following this agreement. Through the increase in economic relations, establishment of the diplomatic missions, arms sales from the US to the Ottoman Empire, and arrival of the Protestant missionaries to the Ottoman lands, the US diplomats established close relations with the Ottoman statesmen. The cordial relationship was fostered as the US diplomats in Istanbul did not try to interfere in Empire's domestic problems and the Sublime Port was convinced that US did not have any secret ambition for the Ottoman lands.
As Erhan states, however, although there were positive factors to further improve bilateral relations, the Sublime Port still did not consider the US as one of the great powers, such as Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Austria.
Despite developing relations, number of problems emerged towards the end of this era; US criticism about the legal status of the Straits, judicial and nationality problems of the US citizens who settled in Ottoman lands, missionary activities of US citizens, support of the Americans to Christian nations that rebelled against Ottoman rule. Although the US had not officially pursued a policy against the Ottoman Empire, emerging problems nevertheless started to affect bilateral relations.
The last era taken by the book covers from 1867 to 1917, which is named by the author as the "Era of Eastern Question and the US". Ottoman-US relations got worse day-by-day during this period. The author connects the emerging US imperialism and its policy towards the Sublime Porte, in this era, as the US started to pursue imperialist policies and aimed to expand its economic, political and military influence around the world. This general tendency also affected its bilateral relations with the Ottoman Empire. Erhan argues that the US in this period not only supported Ottoman millets directly in their independence struggles, but the US missionaries too played an important role at the emergence of nationalism among various ethnic groups within the Empire. Erhan follows this pattern trough uprisings in Crete, Bulgaria and among the Armenian population. He also argues that the Ottoman policies against rebel nations caused the Ottoman and Turkish image to be tainted in the US.
The book ends with Chester Project, which was the first direct investment attempt of the US capital into Anatolia, and with the ending of the diplomatic relations with the World War I.
While preparing this book, the author utilised historical documents extensively from US' National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), British Foreign Office and Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry. This strengthened objectivity and quality. But his preference or inevitability of not using the archives of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions stands out as the book's main deficiency, though he tried to compensate this deficiency by using memories of missionaries, visitors diaries and books that explain missionary activities in the Ottoman Empire.
With its simple language and user-friendly reading, the book would be of interest not only to experts of Turkish-American relations but also to students and even ordinary curious whose knowledge about the Turkish-American relations is limited. In this context, the usage of the visual materials, such as the historical documents that was utilised in the book, could have added significantly to book's appeal. Although Turkish-American relations after the World War II has become subject of many scholarly inquiries, the Ottoman-American relations has not received enough attention so far. Erhan's book is a strong step to fill gap in this respect. Although started approximately one century before 1945, political relations between Turkey and the United States had never been too close, while economic and trade relations were always above average. Until 1920s, Washington's "non involvement" policy based on the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 on the one hand, and Istanbul's decision to give priority to closer relations with the European powers on the other, prevented creation of a multi-dimensional cooperation between these two countries of eastern and western hemispheres. During the inter-war years, both parties tried to reestablish diplomatic ties, broken in 1917, with the United States' entrance to the War; and political relations, besides the economic one, were resumed stronger than before. However, the turning point in the relations was the declaration of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, which symbolized the beginning of the Cold War and Turkey's alliance with the United States. Although shaken by number of serious crises from time to time, main course of the relations between the two states has been in a flourishing path since then.
GOKHAN ERDEM
*Gokhan Erdem is research assistant at the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University. Tiirk-Amerikan ili §kileri is an over-size (24 cm) 408-page book, written in single space, Times-New Roman 12 points font, thus contains very detailed information on the subject. Dr. Uslu sustained great effort not to miss any single event in 50 years history of the bilateral relations. This concern, on the one hand, makes the book a reference source for Turkish-American relations, but on the other, creates difficulties to read it within a theoretical context. In order to overcome these difficulties, Dr. Uslu added two complimentary conceptual chapters into his book as an introductory to the history of the relations: "The Theoretical Base of Turkish-American Relations" and "Foreign Policy Formation in Turkey and the USA". In both chapters Dr. Uslu tries to answer basic questions such as, "In a small-big power relationship which side gets more benefits?"; "To what extent can a big power influence and change foreign policies, decisions and actions of its smaller ally and force it to act in a certain way?"; "To what extent can a big power influence national causes and internal policies of its smaller ally?"; "How does a small power act when it faces threats and pressures from its big ally?", etc. (London, Frank Cass, 1981) lists Turkey as one of the weak states, and Dr. Uslu seems deeply influenced by Handel's views (pp. 29-33). However, Dr. Uslu's evaluation of Turkey as a small/weak state is a highly questionable approach, as recent analyses of Turkey's position in the international system focus on "middle power" or "medium power" term rather than "weak state" approach. While Handel names Turkey as a weak state by using criteria such as population, area, economy, national resources, military strength, William Hale and Baskin Oran find the term "medium power" more suitable by using the same criteria. Clearly, Dr. Uslu, also bears some concerns for determining Turkey's relations with the United States as "patron-client state relationship", as he affirms in p. 33 that, "it might be said that the US-Turkish relationship bore some characteristics of the patronclient relationship but not enough to fit this categorization. Especially, after 1965 it cannot be said that Turkey followed US policy step by step. Nevertheless, the US was generally happy with the Turkish governments' general attitude until July 1975 when the functioning of US bases in Turkey was halted".
As a point to appreciate, the author touches upon the development of foreign policy decision-making processes of the US (pp. 67-79). For Turkish readers, topics such as effects of the public opinion, military, the Congress, the National Security Council on American foreign policy formation and philosophical Burcu Bostanoglu's book on the politics of relations between Turkey and the US, represents a substantially different outlook on the subject by analysing it through the perspective of critical theory.
The book devotes a huge part to the theoretical development of International Relations as a discipline of the social sciences. It begins with idealism and goes on with a lengthy criticism of positivism and its reflection in International Relations, the realist paradigm and modernism.
Bostanoglu's work is important and a breakthrough among the works on Turkish foreign policy in the sense that it tries to transcend the realist paradigm prevalent in Turkish foreign policy researches. More than being a study on Turkish foreign policy, the book is also a useful source for the study of International Relations theory since it spares around 200 pages for the theoretical arguments and it gives a general outline of US foreign policy in the 20 th century.
Bostanoglu tries to analyse what she calls "the politics of Turkish-American relations" by using the premises of critical theory. She argues that contrary to the narrow power-interest centred realist paradigm, with this approach the totality of relations could be encompassed. This unique endeavour itself is worthy of praise.
The author focuses on three cases, two of which are Turkey's participation in the US-led war efforts (the Korean War and the Gulf War) where Turkey's policies converge with the US, and in one of them their policies diverge -the Cyprus question. Turkey's participation in the Korean War, which shows Ankara's desire to take part in the Western world and specifically in NATO, coincided with the establishment/strengthening of the US world hegemony after the World War II. The second case study is the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 where Turkey tried to consolidate its place within the Western world on the verge of the "New World Order". And the third case is the Cyprus question, a point of contention between Turkey and the US since the early 1960s.
After giving a detailed analysis of realism, neo-realism and critical theory, the book offers the development of the concept of hegemony and pays special attention to the US hegemony and Turkey's place in US hegemonic world order. In the book, the parallelism between US foreign policy and the academic development of International Relations as a discipline is explicated succinctly.
It is the contention of the author that Turkey has taken part within the US global hegemony by consent, in the Gramscian sense, used in International Relations by Robert Cox. Therefore, the two of the three cases represents the "consent" while the other one represents "coercion" (the arms embargo).
Rightfully, the author claims that the realist paradigm is part of the US academic/hegemonic tool and realist outlook to foreign policy constitutes the main pillar of US hegemonic practice.
Despite its novel approach to a very traditional subject, Bostanoglu's work suffers from an important deficiency. Although the author takes up the subject from a critical theory perspective, we do not see any class-based analysis for explaining Turkish foreign policy in general and vis-d-vis the US specifically. Turkey, according to the author, tries to be part of the Western world, but this aspiration is taken for granted, without probing and analysing the class basis of such a policy. Bostanoglu argues that Turkey joined the Korean War to gain membership in NATO, without any pressure from the US, i.e., with "consent." It is surprising to see here that she follows the traditional-realist line of argument that the reason for Turkey's willingness to be a member of NATO is the result of the "Turkey's fear of the Soviets and the Soviet demands on the Bosphorous and the Eastern provinces (pp. 337-338, 398) . It is argued that Turkey has been trying to be a Westernised country for two centuries and Democrat Party wanted Turkey to be a developed country, that Turkey wanted to liberalise its economy with consent and in expectation of foreign aid (pp. 332, 338), and that this policy contains sentimental overtones as well (p. 398).
In a similar vein, the relationship between the two countries are analysed at the governmental level. Bostanoglu avoids to construct her analysis on the societal level although civil society is the main factor in forming the "consent" and this fact is indeed stressed by the author herself (p. 379). Bostanoglu's explanation for this is "the lack of the participation of Turkish civil society in the US hegemonic world order" (p. 380). This puts aside the most crucial element of the critical theory perspective and the author simply ignores the role of the civil society in the analysis on the grounds that the participation of civil society in Turkey in the relationship is weak. In fact, there is a huge literature on the role and development of civil society in Turkey and its influence on foreign policy such as Caglar Keyder, Dogan Avcioglu and others. Especially important in this regard is the role of the burgeoning trading class during the Second World War years. Though based on a more instrumentalist version of Marxian analysis Tiirkkaya Ataov's early work on Turkish-American relations (Amerika, NATO ve Tiirkiye, 1969) and Haluk Gerger's book on political-economy of Turkish foreign policy are good examples how this class forced the government immediately after the war years to have closer relations with the US and sought membership in NATO The second point that should be pointed out is the concept of (national) interest which Bostanoglu uses in the book without giving any definition of it. It is interesting that the author severely criticises Turkish foreign policy because of its inefficiency in pursuing the national interest (p. 338), Turkey was unable to use the gains it could have achieved by using its geopolitical situation (p. 339) and Turkey was not strong enough in influencing the Turkic origin Caucasus and Central Asian republics (p. 340). With sentences like "Turkey is doomed to loose if it follows the same passive policy of 1950s in the 1990s" (p. 342), "...Turkey could not develop an active policy in line with its interests concerning the Cyprus issue" (p. 435), "Turkey, with its potential to be a regional power, is a country that should have a more influential role on Baghdad" (p. 416); the author recommends policy options for the official foreign policy basing on the premises of the realist perspective.
In general, Bostanoglu's book represents a fresh outlook to the foreign policy works and is stimulating for the new studies to come. This edited volume brings together a group of experts with varied backgrounds to provide an impressive collection mostly to the American audience. With their diverse backgrounds and wellestablished credentials in government, journalism and academia, and with their knowledge of Turkey and the Turkish language, the contributors are able to present lucid, well written, easily digestible and argumentative chapters on post cold war Turkey and TurkishAmerican relations.
ILHAN UZGEL
Certain individual chapters within the book are of high quality and offer significant insight into the nitty-gritty of different aspects of Turkish-American relations. Heath Lowry and Alan Makovksy especially provide useful perceptions into the past and the future of the relationship between the two countries. Their balanced analyses of opportunities for improvement of this relationship and obstacles for further enhancement provide useful sobering warnings as well as hope for the future of the relationship that 'has implications for American interests far beyond those of Soviet containment 1 (p. vi).
Even those contributions that leave the reader with a less satisfactory taste are well structured and professionally done. Their weaknesses flow mainly from the fact that their authors' primary "tlhan Uzgel is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University. interest is not Turkish-American relations per se. The book was commissioned by an American foundation for the American audience with an intention to explain them the importance of Turkey for the American interests, without much scholarly concern. The fact that three of the seven authors (Abramowitz, Wilkonson and Makovsky) have worked or still working for the US government; one author (Candar) is a journalist; and the main area of specialisation of the rest of the authors is not the TurkishAmerican relations (6ni § is an economist; Robins is an expert on Turkey's Middle Eastern policy and Lowry is an Ottoman historian), reflected in the book's occasional flaws, which are not miany in any case.
Despite the individual quality of most of the chapters, the collection as a whole lacks a coherent framework and fails to be a comprehensive study of all aspects of US-Turkish relations. While domestic aspects of both countries figure predominantly on many chapters (chapters 2-6), only chapter seven deals with a third-party involvement to the smooth functioning of the relationship between the two countries. One expects to find additional chapters dealing with Turkish-American-Israeli triangle, or Turkish-US cooperation in the 'Caspian Games', though many authors take them up in passing. Also Oni §'s chapter is a survey of Turkey's economic problems and how these are relevant to Turkish-US relations is not made clear, except a rightful conclusion that there is a room for improvement (pp. 114-115) . Candar, on the other hand, being an ardent supporter and sometimes advisor/originator of late president Ozal's 'active foreign policy', cannot occasionally escape from partiality and a bias approach. Finally, despite an excellent Introduction and Overview by Morton Abramowitz, the book needs a concluding chapter that could have summarized the findings of the various chapters into a coherent whole to present guidelines for the future, though again many authors do that individually.
Another problem that bothers the reader is the result of the dynamism that overwhelms Turkey specialist; Turkey is a country on the move and change in every aspect of the daily life from economics to foreign policy is an inescapable phenomenon. The authors of individual chapters of this book were also caught by this dynamism, thus detailed information are sometimes outdated (for example see pp. 11, 13, 112, 235, 258) , though not their overall analysis.
The main problem with the book is that it is an edited volume; thus, like all other such works, brings together some perfect and some not so-good articles. Nevertheless, there are good and insightful individual papers and overall it does justice to its stated aim, that is, to offer 'insightful and important explanation(s) of American interests, Turkey's domestic problems, and a likely future agenda of bilateral relations' (p. vii). In short, it would be a good addition to Turkish foreign policy studies and for those who wish to get a grasp of how American foreign policy is made regarding its smaller allies.
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